Evidence That Initial Obedient Killing Fuels Subsequent Volitional Killing Beyond Effects Of Practice by Martens, A. et al.
Killing Begets Killing 
 
1
Running Head: KILLING BEGETS KILLING 
 
 
 
Evidence That Initial Obedient Killing Fuels  
Subsequent Volitional Killing Beyond Effects Of Practice 
 
Andy Martens 
University of Canterbury 
 
Spee Kosloff 
University of Arizona 
 
Lydia Eckstein Jackson 
University of Tennessee 
 
 
 
Reference:  
Martens, A., Kosloff, S., Eckstein-Jackson, L. (in press). Evidence that initial obedient killing 
fuels subsequent volitional killing beyond effects of practice. Social Psychological and 
Personality Science. 
 
Please address correspondence to Andy Martens, Department of Psychology, University of 
Canterbury, Private Bag 4800, Christchurch, New Zealand; e-mail: 
andy.martens@canterbury.ac.nz 
 
Acknowledgements. We thank Jemma Davies and Saul Gibney for the data collection, and 
Glenn Lewis for constructing the study apparatus. Thanks also to Sam Lister, Lowell 
Gaertner, and Garth Fletcher for feedback on this manuscript. This research received no 
specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors. 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Research using a bug-killing paradigm has suggested that increased initial killing may 
promote increased subsequent killing (Martens et al., 2007). Here we tested whether this 
effect is due to killing per se or merely due to practice, and whether this initial repeated bug-
killing exerts its effect by desensitizing people or by motivating them to kill more. 
Participants were asked to place bugs into an “extermination grinder” at their own pace after 
putting either one or five bugs into the grinder initially. Participants either believed they were 
actually killing the bugs or knew they were not. Results showed that the initial-killing effect 
occurred only when people thought they were killing, suggesting this is not merely a practice 
effect. Also, suggesting a motivational component, among participants who killed five bugs 
initially, those who believed they were killing went on to kill more than those who knew the 
killing was simulated.  
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Evidence That Initial Obedient Killing Fuels Subsequent Volitional Killing Beyond Effects 
Of Practice 
Does engaging in killing make a person more likely to kill subsequently? 
Observations of various manifestations of killing—from the killing of animals, to war and 
genocide—suggest that killing initially can be emotionally difficult and traumatic for the 
perpetrator, and is thus an act that people generally avoid (e.g., Grossman, 2001; McNair, 
2002; White, 1998). However, others have suggested that the more a person kills, the more 
these acts of destruction may gain a momentum of their own, increasing the likelihood of 
further killing (e.g., Staub, 2002; Charny, 2002; Wright & Hensley, 2003; Zimbardo, 2004).   
Experimental work has begun to examine the hypothesis that killing can fuel further 
killing, using a paradigm in which participants are led to believe (falsely) that they are killing 
bugs by putting them into an “extermination grinder” (Martens, Kosloff, Greenberg, Landau, 
& Schmader, 2007). This research showed that inducing the obedient killing of five bugs led 
to more subsequent volitional killing than inducing the obedient killing of just one bug. 
Drawing on the work of a number of researchers (Festinger, 1957; Lifton, 1986; Darley, 
1992; Baumeister, 1996; Gross, 2006; Tavris & Aronson, 2007), the explanation proposed for 
this effect is that after killing one bug initially, people inhibit subsequent killing in order to 
avoid dissonance (e.g., shame, guilt) that would otherwise result from further killing. But 
after killing five bugs initially, individuals cross a threshold or “point of no return,” such that 
continued/increased killing becomes a means of justifying the prior killing—that is, of 
convincing oneself (and others) that the killing was warranted and permissible in the first 
place. Thus, we suggest the effect of dissonance on killing reverses itself depending on the 
degree of initial killing. With little (1 bug) or no initial killing, dissonance should decrease 
subsequent killing. But repeated initial bug-killing (e.g., five bugs) should commit people to 
this line of behavior, making justification of the behavior through increased subsequent 
killing more likely. 
However, alternative, non-motivational explanations for these data remain, which we 
attempted to address in the present study. Firstly, the effect of killing five bugs observed in 
the prior research (Martens et al., 2007) may not have been a result of initial killing per se, 
but rather merely the result of practice. It could be that putting five bugs into the grinder 
initially, as opposed to one, increased the fluidity of people’s physical performance during 
the later killing task and for this reason led to more killing; or perhaps performing any action 
more frequently simply primes people to perform this action with greater frequency later on 
(e.g., Bargh & Chartrand, 1999).  
Secondly, if the effect is a result of killing per se, it may be that the initial killing of 
five bugs, rather than motivating more killing, desensitizes people to bug-killing more than 
does killing a single bug; thus subsequent killing is made more likely simply because it 
becomes easier emotionally (e.g., Carnagy, Anderson, & Bushman, 2007; Grossman, 2001). 
In other words, this passive desensitization account suggests that the prior finding may reflect 
inhibition of volitional killing after low initial killing (one bug) and relaxation of this 
inhibition after repeated initial killing (five bugs).  
The Present Study 
First, the present study examined whether repeated bug-killing in itself begets further 
volitional bug-killing, or whether this effect is merely a function of practice. To do so, we 
extended the past experiment (Martens et al., 2007) by adding a control condition that 
resembled the killing condition in all ways but one: we informed participants at the outset 
that the killing task would be a simulation, i.e., that the bugs would not be killed. All the 
physical aspects of the experiment that might elicit non-killing-related practice effects 
(including the use of real bugs1), therefore, were the same for these participants. If the effect 
of repeated initial bug-killing on subsequent killing emerges because of practice, then the one 
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vs. five effect on subsequent killing should emerge with the simulated killing. Conversely, if 
the effect is a consequence of the killing per se, then the one vs. five effect should emerge 
only when participants think they are actually killing. 
Second, this paradigm allowed us to examine the competing passive-desensitization 
and motivational dissonance-reduction accounts—particularly by comparing the effect of 
actual vs. simulated killing among participants who initially put five bugs into the grinder. If 
the initial killing of five bugs increases subsequent killing because of passive 
desensitization—because people adapt to the task through repetition, making subsequent 
killing less difficult emotionally—then subsequent killing among those who initially think 
they killed five bugs should approximate what we observe in the more emotionally benign 
(i.e., less emotionally difficult) simulation task. In contrast, if the motivational account is 
correct, then initially killing five bugs, rather than dampening the emotional response to the 
killing, should elicit dissonance which individuals seek to reduce through increased killing, to 
justify the initial five exterminations. Consequently, subsequent killing among those who 
initially killed five bugs should surpass that observed in the relatively low-dissonance parallel 
simulation condition. That is, if exterminating five bugs is emotionally burdensome and thus 
motivates further extermination to justify the initial repeated killing, then individuals who 
believe they killed five bugs should show an elevated tendency to kill relative to participants 
in the relatively emotionally benign five-bug/simulation condition. 
Method 
Participants 
One-hundred-and-eleven undergraduates at the University of Canterbury participated 
and were compensated with a ten-dollar voucher. Five participants discontinued the 
experiment after reading the consent form. Four participants were excluded from analyses 
because they expressed strong suspicion that they were not actually killing the bugs. Four 
participants were excluded due to procedural problems. This left 98 participants (41 male, 57 
female). 
Materials and Procedure  
Participants were run one at a time. They arrived at the laboratory, were greeted by 
the experimenter and seated at a table in the corner of the room behind cubicle partitions. The 
participants first received an “overview of the study”: the experimenter explained that the 
study looks at “various types of human-animal interactions” and that in “this particular 
session we’ll look at the role of exterminators who deal with bugs.” The experimenter 
informed participants that “the study does involve engaging in a bug extermination task” and 
that they would answer questions about this experience after this task. Participants were then 
provided a consent form to read and sign if they wished to participate. 
As participants read the consent form, the experimenter proceeded to a table at the 
other end of the room, out of sight of the participant, and set up the “extermination machine” 
with which participants would ostensibly kill bugs. The extermination machine (Figure 1) 
was a modified coffee grinder, created by attaching a plastic tube and funnel to the side of the 
grinder. Thus, a bug dropped into the funnel would appear to fall through the tube and into 
the grinder (though in actuality the tube was blocked did not lead into the grinder). The 
machine had a grinder-activation button on its side. Its default position was “off” and 
pressing the button activated the grinder for as long as it was depressed. 
After setting up the extermination grinder, the experimenter retrieved the bugs 
(Figures 1 and 2) from an adjoining room, briefly heating them with a hairdryer for 5-10 
seconds; this triggered movement in the bugs, thus ensuring that participants knew the bugs 
were alive. Next to the extermination machine, the experimenter set up either one or five 
small translucent cups, each one containing a small bug—a slater, similar to a pillbug. The 
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slaters measured approximately 1 centimeter in length. Behind either the one or five cup(s), 
the experimenter set a plastic tray with twenty cups, each containing a single slater.  
The experimenter escorted the participant to the table where the extermination task 
was to take place and showed the participant the plastic cups, pointing out that each contained 
a bug. The experimenter stated that “to start off, I’m going to have you familiarize yourself 
with our extermination task.” The experimenter indicated the grinder, describing it as “a 
grinder, our extermination machine.” The experimenter added that “generally, exterminators 
use poison sprays but we can’t use those sprays inside the building for health and safety 
reasons.”  
Manipulation of perceived killing.  The experimenter subsequently showed half of the 
participants, randomly assigned, that “the tube attached to the grinder is blocked off and does 
not lead into the grinder, so the bugs that you’ll put into the funnel won’t make it to the actual 
grinder and won’t be killed.” Thus, these participants were under the impression that the 
study was simply examining “human-animal interactions” by way of this simulated 
extermination. In debriefing, participants in the simulation conditions reported thinking of the 
study in this way, and were not suspicious about the procedures. All other participants 
remained under the impression that they were indeed exterminating bugs.  
Manipulation of initial killing. Next, ostensibly in order to become familiar with the 
extermination task, participants were randomly assigned either “to dump one bug into the 
grinder” or “to dump five bugs into the grinder, one at a time.” The experimenter continued 
that “the next step is to turn on the extermination machine by pressing the button for at least 
three seconds.” Once participants complied, the experimenter explained that “the 
familiarization part of the procedure” was completed and that “a brief extermination 
experience” would follow.  
Extermination task. For the extermination task, each participant was instructed “to put 
bugs into the grinder, one at a time, for a 12-second period”; this was ostensibly to ensure 
that “everybody in the study has the same length extermination experience.” Further, 
participants were asked “to do this task continuously but at your own pace over the 12-second 
period.” The experimenter then handed the participant a digital timer set to 12 seconds and 
said: “When I leave the room, hit the start button and put the bugs into the grinder. When the 
12 seconds are up, the alarm will go off. At that point, press the stop button on the timer and 
turn on the grinder for at least three seconds. I’ll come back in once you’ve finished.” The 
number of bugs participants put into the grinder served as the dependent measure.  
After the extermination task, the experimenter returned and presented participants 
with a brief questionnaire. The questionnaire first presented six filler questions, followed by 
two questions assessing whether putting bugs into the grinder was relatively volitional during 
the 12-second period compared to the initial familiarization period: “During the 12-second 
timed extermination task, to what extent did you feel that the number of bugs you put in was 
your choice?” and “In the first task when you familiarized yourself with the extermination 
procedure, to what extent did you feel that the number of bugs you put in was your choice?” 
Participants responded to each item on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 9 (completely). With 
these two items entered into a repeated measures ANOVA, perceived choice of number of 
bugs put into the grinder during the 12-second period (M = 6.46, SD = 2.36) was well above 
the midline and significantly exceeded the choice perceived during the initial familiarization 
task (M = 3.27, SD = 2.73), F (1, 96) = 112.25, p < .01.  
Lastly, participants recorded their age (M = 20.77, SD = 5.76) and gender. When the 
participants had completed this questionnaire, the experimenter sensitively debriefed them 
and assessed their level of suspicion.  
Results 
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First, we sought to replicate past work—to observe whether killing five bugs initially 
led to more relatively volitional bug-killing than killing only one initially—as well as to test 
whether mere practice could account for this effect. We conducted a 2 (Initial Killing: one vs. 
five bugs) × 2 (Simulation Knowledge: ostensibly real killing vs. openly simulated killing) × 
2 (Gender: male vs. female) ANOVA with the number of bugs participants put into the 
grinder at their own pace during the 12-second task as the dependent measure. Only the 
Initial Killing × Simulation Knowledge interaction was significant, F (1, 90) = 7.53, p < .01.2 
Replicating past work, pairwise comparisons showed that, among participants who thought 
they were actually killing bugs, those initially led to kill five bugs went on to kill more during 
the 12-second task (M = 5.85, SD = 2.20) than those initially led to kill only one bug (M = 
4.50, SD = 1.67), F (1, 90) = 7.61, p < .01, Cohen’s d = .69.3 Participants who knew the 
killing was simulated, however, did not differ based on whether they initially put one or five 
bugs into the grinder (Ms = 5.28 and 4.82, SDs = 1.75 and 1.33, respectively), p > .20. Thus, 
as depicted in Figure 3, the tendency for repeated initial obedient bug-killing to heighten 
subsequent volitional bug-killing is not merely a product of practice, but rather is a function 
of repeated killing in itself. 
We next examined the previously discussed motivational-dissonance and passive-
desensitization accounts for this effect. Both explanations would predict that people who 
killed one bug initially should show an aversion to or inhibition of subsequent killing in the 
perceived-killing condition, relative to the emotionally easier simulation condition. 
Consistent with this prediction, a trend emerged such that among participants who put only 
one bug into the grinder initially, those who believed they were killing put fewer bugs into 
the grinder during the self-paced 12-second task than those who knew the killing was 
simulated, F (1, 90) = 3.39, p =.07, Cohen’s d = .46. However, supporting the motivational 
account, among those who put five bugs into the grinder initially, participants who believed 
they were actually killing went on to kill more during the 12-second task than those in the 
emotionally easier simulation condition, F (1, 90) = 4.18, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .57. Thus, 
initial killing of five bugs did not simply reduce the inhibitory influence of killing observed 
in the one kill condition, but actually increased killing behavior relative to the five 
bug/simulation condition. This suggests that the initial believed killing of five bugs did not 
simply desensitize participants, but rather motivated them to kill more bugs than those in the 
parallel yet emotionally benign simulation condition.  .  
Discussion 
The results demonstrated that the effect of repeated initial, obedient killing (five bugs) 
on subsequent self-paced, volitional killing is not simply a result of physical practice, but an 
effect of actual killing. Repeatedly putting bugs into the grinder in the initial task increased 
the number of bugs subsequently put into the grinder only when people believed they were 
actually killing, not when people knew the killing was simulated. This provides compelling 
evidence that actual killing can have a promulgating effect.   
Why does this promulgating effect of repeated bug-killing emerge? The findings 
suggest that this effect emerged at least in part from a motivation to kill, rather than solely 
from habituation or desensitization to the act of killing. After repeated initial bug-killing, 
people went on to put more bugs into the grinder than those in the parallel simulation 
condition for whom the task was emotionally easier at the outset—thus they appeared to be 
killing at a rate that exceeded what we could expect from desensitization alone. We theorized 
that because killing is a morally proscribed behavior, individuals are generally motivated to 
inhibit the action and thereby avoid dissonance. But repeated initial killing, by committing 
people to this line of behavior, may redirect the strategy for dissonance reduction toward 
killing more, in an effort to justify one’s otherwise morally discrepant actions. Given that one 
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already has repeatedly violated a moral standard, ceasing to do so becomes less viable for 
reducing dissonance than continuing to do so in an effort to justify the behavior.  
This theorizing suggests that the differences between the killing and simulation 
conditions are mediated by dissonance resulting from the ethically problematic nature of the 
killing task relative to the simulation task. Initially putting one bug in the grinder presumably 
led to more dissonance in the killing condition than in the simulation condition, and this 
elevation in dissonance presumably led to fewer bugs put into the grinder during the self-
paced 12-second extermination task. Initially putting five bugs into the grinder should have 
likewise led to more dissonance in the killing condition than in the simulation condition, but 
in turn led to more bugs put into the grinder subsequently. 
 While the present study provided evidence in favor of the motivational explanation 
for the effect of repeated killing, we did not directly assess whether the simulation condition 
was less emotionally and ethically threatening than the condition in which people believed 
they were actually killing, and whether the emotional and ethical difficulties accompanying 
the believed killing drove the observed effects. Though it may appear intuitive that engaging 
in an actual killing behavior is more negatively arousing and personally threatening than 
merely simulating that behavior, it is certainly preferable to verify theorized processes. 
However, there is also reason to think that had we asked participants about these feelings and 
emotions after the initial killing task that their expression of these emotions could have 
inadvertently dissolved their potency (see work on the effects of emotional expression on 
diminishing both dissonance and aggression, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Sideris, & 
Stubing, 1993 and Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990).  
Consequently, we adopted alternative approaches to verifying whether indeed people 
who believed they were killing experienced more affective/ethical discomfort than those who 
knew they were not in fact killing. Firstly, we examined our behavioral findings among those 
who initially put one bug into the grinder. When participants believed they initially killed a 
bug, they later put fewer bugs into the grinder than in the parallel simulation-control 
condition. Though marginal, this effect appears difficult to explain without reference to a 
motivated resistance to killing, and thus strongly suggests that participants found the bug-
killing task aversive and more discomforting than the simulation task.  
We also collected additional data to bolster the critical assumption that those who 
believed they were killing experienced more ethical concerns and emotionality than those in 
the simulation condition. We told 43 people (drawn from the same population used for the 
present study) that we were planning a new study and wanted feedback about how they 
thought they would respond to such a procedure if they were participants. They read a very 
basic description of the initial killing task and we varied whether the study was described as 
one in which they would be asked to actually kill one bug or to pretend to kill one bug. After 
this they rated on a 9-point scale how unethical they thought participating in this study would 
be and how ashamed they would feel as a result of having participated. Higher numbers 
reflected feeling the task was unethical and feeling more shame, and we averaged these two 
items to form a composite reflecting ethical difficulty (a = .86). Those participants who rated 
the task that entailed killing a bug thought the task would be ethically difficult, with ratings 
above the midpoint, M = 5.60 (SD = 2.16) and significantly higher than those who rated the 
task of only pretending to kill a bug, M = 2.94 (SE = 1.75), F (1, 41) = 17.90, p < .01. Taking 
these lines of evidence together, it seems very likely that people experienced the killing task 
as more ethically aversive and dissonance-provoking than the simulation task.  
Still, more work examining the mediating aspects of the effect of repeated killing 
seems warranted. Future work, for example, might examine dissonance covertly, perhaps 
physiologically, as well as measure perceptions of commitment to the killing task (which we 
have theorized shifts the path adopted to reduce dissonance, from that of going on to kill less 
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to that of going on to kill more). Future work might also examine mediating factors by 
combining an individual difference approach used in prior similar research (Martens et al., 
2007) with the “simulation” methodology used in the present research. This prior work found 
that initial perceived similarity to bugs moderated the one vs. five effect, presumably because 
this individual difference predicts who will feel uneasy and dissonant about the bug-killing. 
In the present research we would expect, therefore, that similarity should again moderate the 
one vs. five effect—that this one vs. five effect would emerge particularly for those higher in 
similarity—but only in the “killing” condition. In the simulation conditions we would expect 
no such effect, or a less pronounced effect, given the more ethically benign nature of the 
simulation task.  
Conclusion 
The current data are importantly limited by the targets of killing used: bugs. Work 
may attempt to examine with archival data whether similar patterns of behavior exist with 
other animals and with human beings as targets of killing. The current data present 
compelling evidence that the promulgating effect of the repeated killing of bugs does have to 
do with killing itself, not with other physical aspects of the experimental procedure. Thus the 
present findings suggest the importance of considering that similar patterns may play out in 
other forms of killing too.  
These data and our accompanying theorizing may also have additional implications 
for non-lethal harmful behaviors that violate moral standards, though killing has properties 
that surely also render its behavioral consequences unique. For example, killing cannot be 
undone, and is the ultimate form of violence. If, as theorized, commitment to the unethical act 
plays a critical role in triggering the continuation of this behavior, then the irreversible nature 
of killing may mean it has the potential to spiral out of control even more quickly than other 
forms of violence or unethical behaviour. Consequently, application of this theorizing to the 
stemming of human conflicts suggests particularly careful monitoring of situations with an 
enhanced potential for people to kill repeatedly.  
Our theorizing and data also may have implications for aftermath in human conflicts, 
and specifically for dealing with individual perpetrators of killing. Psychological insights into 
the processes that contribute to the successful reintegration of former combatants and child 
soldiers into civilian life are crucial, and psychological “retraining” is being discussed in the 
context of post-conflict disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs 
(e.g., Humphreys & Weinstein, 2007; Wessels, 2004). If desensitization alone explains the 
promulgating effect of killing, then efforts should focus on re-sensitizing people to the 
negative consequences of violence. However, the motivational theorizing that explained the 
current data—that repeated killing can drive people to kill again in an effort to justify their 
prior actions and in turn keep dissonance at bay—suggests that these efforts should also 
somehow entail addressing people’s shame/guilt or their potential for shame/guilt associated 
with their actions. For example, perhaps avenues can be provided that allow for constructive 
coping with these emotions. One possibility is suggested by an Iraq War Veteran, that a 
particularly direct and powerful way to atone for the taking of life may be to work to literally 
give or save it in some way. Having saved each rifle cartridge he used lethally in Iraq, he 
explains: “Too much life was taken by these magazines; too much for one person to bear. 
When I look at these it just reminds me I gotta give a life back” (Shapiro, 2005).  
Mass killing of human beings, and more generally the maintenance of unethical 
behavior, are complex phenomena that cannot be reduced to one or two causes. However, 
despite these limitations, we hope the present experimental investigation and future 
extensions will provide contributions that can, together with other forms of study, converge 
on a more complete understanding of the perpetuation of these behaviors.  
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Notes 
1. We thought that using living bugs in this condition provided a better control than 
alternative possibilities, such as using non-living, similarly-sized targets (e.g., coffee 
beans) because we kept constant variables such as the target’s movement that could 
distract or otherwise affect participants’ performance.  
2. The only other effect to approach significance was a trend for men to put more bugs into 
the grinder, p = .09; ps ≥ .30 for all other main effects and interactions.  
3. Though we found that initially killing five bugs led to more subsequent killing than 
initially killing one bug, we did not test the effect of killing five bugs against a control 
condition in which participants killed no bugs initially. A supplemental study addressed 
this possibility. Forty-three participants (22 male, 21 female) either engaged in no initial 
killing at all prior to a 20-second self-paced killing task (the experimenter just showed 
them the apparatus and explained the procedure to them) or engaged in the initial killing 
of five bugs before the 20-second self-paced killing task. Those led to kill five bugs went 
on to kill more (M = 8.63, SD = 2.96) than those who did not kill initially (M = 6.79, SD = 
2.12), F (1, 41) = 5.18, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .71 (note that these means cannot be easily 
compared with those in the main study because the length of the timed extermination 
tasks differed—12 seconds in the main study vs. 20 seconds in this supplemental study). 
Thus, the initial killing of five bugs produces more subsequent killing than both the initial 
killing of one bug and than no initial killing. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The bug-killing machine and tray containing 20 slaters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2. A slater, measuring approximately 1 cm in length. 
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Figure 3. Bugs killed during the 12-second task as a function of Initial Killing and Simulation 
Knowledge. 
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